Philippa Foot Utilitarianism Views

Utilitarianism states that welfare is the highest principle of human activity; everything that is useful for people or promotes their welfare is good for them. Labor is useful for the formation of the human mind. A moderate way of life and unpleasant medicines are useful for the preservation of life. Based on the requirements of reasonable nature, preferring the useful over the pleasant also forms the basis of the doctrine about welfare as the main principle of morality. The main goal of the paper is to present Philippa Foot’s views on utilitarianism in her book, “Utilitarianism and the Virtues.” Foot’s thesis is that human happiness is in human life because each life is worth living irrespective of difficulties or extreme situations. The paper will start with Foot’s argument for this thesis, followed by the objection to this argument, resulting in the philosopher’s response to this objection.

Utilitarian philosophers do not recognize the need for special moral principles, such as not lying, respecting justice, and keeping promises. Utilitarian philosophers share the opinion that the action leading to the greatest possible happiness of the greatest number of people is always correct. Happiness and pleasures compose the only absolutely and internally valuable things in the universe. Other valuable things are valuable only because they bring happiness. Philippa Foot is one of the few philosophers who, while discussing the question about the value of life per se, contrary to utilitarian philosophers, defends the full intelligence of the belief that an unhappy life is worth living (Hursthouse 180). Only in extreme situations, a death is better than life but nobody has the right to recommend this choice to anybody.

The name of Philippa Foot’s book, which can be considered a direct opponent in outlook to Michael Slote, “Utilitarianism and the Virtues,” corresponds to its contents. Human goodness is natural—neither less nor more than the goodness of other living beings, as defined by the requirements of the outlook setting the norms. he variety of human virtues does not interfere with the idea that the concept of a good human life can be, in the same meaning, the criterion for the characteristics and actions of people, in which flourishing can be the definition of the goodness of animals and plants (Hursthouse 181). Foot develops the thought close to the ideas of “the philosopher of action” Warren Quinn, stating that the concept of practical rationality should be expressed through the concept of benefit—namely, just because it is good to act, it brings some benefit, and people have grounds for its commission (Foot 197). A good action is caused by the absence of anything bad. In this question, Foot’s ideas are equal to the ones of Thomas Aquinas.

Foot’s fundamental thesis states that life is worth living, which means that life is worth living for the people who live their lives (Hursthouse 180). Whatever someone thinks of the value of human life, this opinion should not dissuade from the value of life. The value of each individual life consists only in its usefulness for someone else, leads to infinite regress, and therefore, is extremely absurd (Foot 198). In her book, Philippa Foot (1985) speaks about welfarism and the search for pleasures:

Welfarism has its own peculiar attraction, which has to do with the fact that pleasure, happiness, and the satisfaction of desire are seen as in some way good. But this attraction becomes less powerful as distribution principles are added, and pleasures are discounted on an ad hoc basis to destroy the case for such things as public executions (p. 198).

Philippa asks herself what makes human life worth living. Foot firmly believes that people usually want to live, even when there are more powerful unhappy events than happy ones. She explains her point of view using specific situations. Life in imprisonment is better when compared to premature death. A human life with a serious illness is better than premature death (Hursthouse 181). Life in constant deprivation of food, housing, and medical care is better than premature death. Foot asks herself whether life for seriously ill patients is good. She speculates that life can be good even for the people living due to the medical ventilator. Thus, Philippa Foot comes to the conclusion that life is good per se (Foot 201). Nevertheless, the lives of some people are so awful that it would be more reasonable to die. Therefore, though it is possible to say that life per se is good, it is necessary to add that it should be original human life. She understands usual human life, assuming that a person has a minimum of the main human virtues. Usual human life means that people are not forced to work more than they can; they enjoy family or societal support, or they can satisfy their hunger and hope for the future, as well as restore their strength at night.

Although utilitarian philosophers also speak of good and bad acts, they draw the line between human virtues and actions; however, utilitarianism does not recognize virtue. They believe that human virtues are the negative directions in ethics. Considering all human acts from the point of view of their usefulness, the utilitarian direction absolutely denies morality and virtues but finds human happiness in different pleasures.

However, Foot proves that the idea of usual human life assumes communication between the concept of life and the concept of virtue. Usual human life is good in itself, and its value does not depend on happiness. However, it should be noted that this understanding of the word “usual” is a little extraordinary (Foot 202). Such a concept of usual life extends to human lives that are not usual from different perspectives. For example, Beethoven’s life, in many respects, was extraordinary; however, according to Foot, it fits into the concept of usual human life (Hursthouse 182). The same can be said about human life entirely dependent on the medical ventilator (Hursthouse 183). Thus, Philippa Foot’s conclusion about the virtues of life is close to the perception of life by the majority of people. Explaining the conceptual communication between life and virtues, Foot’s point of view corresponds to common sense, which cannot be considered a shortcoming for the philosopher.