April 25, 2020
Europeanization has been defined in a number of ways. Ladrech (1994, 69) who defines Europeanization basically as “an incremental process of re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the extent that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy making.” This puts more emphasis on what is referred to as ‘top-down approach’ to Europeanization with revolution originating from the force of the Union onto the state policy. The state is observed as re-active towards transformations in the union. another definition that can be considered is by Radaelli, who makes a description of Europeanization as “a process involving, a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public choices” (Radaelli, 2000). From the ‘bottom-up’ approach Europeanization takes when states commence to have an effect on the policy of the European Union in a given field.
Another analysis argues that the international interaction of various policy actors at some levels of European authority results to the redefinition of the regional, national, and various identities within the context of the European, in which the many levels of governance in Europe is not seen as opposing one another necessarily. A representative who is elected, for instance, can see his responsibilities and loyalties as lying with Barcelona, Spain Catalonia, and Europe. Scholars have argued that European states citizens increasingly identify themselves as so, rather than German, French, British, e.t.c.
Creation of a centralized European policy is an obvious area of change in the European institutions; the slow but sure attainment of influence over the national associate governments in many areas and the enlargement of the European Union. For instance the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union; in this case, the countries using the euro have approved control of their monetary guidelines to the European Central Bank. Another viewpoint of the Europeanization is the ‘horizontal approach.’ This advancement takes into account the conveyance of, policies, politics and policy making among member countries of the European Union. This transfer can is founded on a form of ‘soft law’ consequently it is not enforceable, but is founded on ‘best practice’ and reciprocal recognition.
In this paper I shall develop a conceptualization of the Europeanization and provide an understanding of its on going dialectical association with the European integration. To attain this two interrelated objectives shall be pursued. Firstly is the re-assessment of the neo-functionalism as the grand European integration conjecture from a non-positivist point of view and through this reassessment, get together fundamentals of constructivism and positivism in a conceptualization of Europeanization. Secondly, is an examination of the differences between the European amalgamation theory and Europeanization and throughout a break down of neo-functionalism make out different characteristics of Europeanization. This will consent to empirical consistency of fundamentals of neo-functionalism throughout a working conceptualization of Europeanization. In this case theory and reality are known to build up through interactions among chronological environments, individuals and institutions. In this case, three discrete points are made. Firstly, the social actors are continually changing the historical context so as to come up with reality and theory. Secondly, social scientists come up with the concepts that they employ as their limitations become explicit and thirdly, social scientists have failed to be objective inexpressive analysts; they themselves are a part and parcel of the process of construction, as collective values change premise is re-assessed in relation to such changes (George, 1976).
As noted by George (1976) as the major theories of European amalgamation came under analysis and their tribulations became clear, social scientists came up with meta-theories to address their shortcomings. Europeanization can be supposed as a meta-theory principally in relation to intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism. And because of the criticisms faced by the neo-functionalism I will re-assess the grand theory in the framework of social scientists value founded re-formulations of European amalgamation theory and on the historical change. Predictive theory in the social sciences formulation is hard if not difficult and as a result the grand theory for instance neo-functionalism, is viewed as a way of ‘organizing concepts’, ‘selecting relevant facts’ and making a decision on how the ‘narrative should be constructed’ (George, 1976).
Developing and Analyzing Europeanization
Europeanization has many definitions, which some critics argue that detracts from its expounding power and leaves us with a case of ‘conceptual stretching’ (Radaelli, 2000). Europeanization involves downloading or top-down Europeanization and is founded on conceptualizations advanced by Buller and Gamble (2002). ‘Content’ of Europeanization integrates transfer of policy and common beliefs, acknowledged by Radealli (2001) and Olsen (2002). Common beliefs may be practical in the establishment of the Single European Market (SEM) where varied beliefs concerning market are rationalized under one narrow structure. However, even though contradictory understanding of regulation comes up at the home level certain there have been shared beliefs, for instance, moderate market structures in the SEM (Howell, 1999; 2000). Undeniably, the substance of Europeanization comprises of many ideas such as institutional standards (accountability), unofficial rules (democracy), communication (Language used when talking about issues concerning the EU e.g. EMU) and uniqueness (For instance, does the euro endow the EU identity?).
Featherstone and Kazamias (2001) well thought-out that home structures were not the submissive beneficiaries of the impacts of EU. “Domestic and EU institutional settings are intermeshed, with actors engaged in both vertical and horizontal networks and institutional linkages” (p 1). They gave emphasis to adjustments conveyed about on home policy as it regards misfit and fit and how the constituent states deal with these. Nevertheless, “… Europeanization is assumed to be a two way process, between the domestic and the EU levels, involving both top-down and bottom-up pressures” (ibid, p 6). Without a doubt, the amount of accomplishment in the discussions at the EU level involving domestic actors will establish the level of misfit or fit when it comes to implementation of policy. It can be argued that, if at the domestic level there is no misfit, then change has failed to take place, Europeanization has failed to take place. If a constituent state lobbies so much and gets their perspective as a part of the policy, misfit will be partial and resultant domestic transformation will be negligible. This is not an implication that Europeanization has not happened but it’s an implication that bottom-up Europeanization was successful and top-down Europeanization reduced.
Olsen (2002) acknowledged Europeanization as the transformations taking place in constituent countries then sketch out processes of institutional transformation that may make out how/why it happens. On the other hand, although he makes an indication of detached interpretations of Europeanization, the dissimilar conceptualizations are all-encompassing rather than restricted. In his work Olsen breaks down Europeanization into five probable phenomenons when probing what is essentially being changed and makes a consideration that it may be viewed as:
(a) Changes in exterior territorial boundaries
(b) Authority institutions developed at the supranational level
(c) Persuading and imposing supranational at the sub-national and national levels
(d) Taking governance course of action and policy specific for EU beyond EU borders
(e) A mission of a political nature aimed at escalating the amalgamation of the EU.
There are many issues concerning these projected fundamentals of Europeanization. An adjustment to exterior borders or extension integrates a change in the home policies of those becoming constituents of the EU and the existing members who will modify policy to take this expansion into consideration. In this context, taking over states experience vertical policy relocation before gaining to EU membership and EU authority procedures are exercised further than EU borders. Developed control institutions at the supranational rank designate European integration; however the growth of the EU policy-making institute includes up-loading and bottom-up Europeanization. This brings about a small problem for the reason that the advancement of EU policy-making establishments is recurrent so to handle the relations among Europeanization and European amalgamation. In such a way, it’s important for one to take a snapshot from a bottom-up point of view. Alike may perhaps be said of the transformations to the home level through the obligation of supranationality on national and sub-national levels.
In addition to complicatedness with Europeanization there are also intangible problems concerning European amalgamation. For example, in various definitions it is hard to tell apart between European integration and Europeanization in others they give the impression to be the same. In this circumstance, why trouble with the idea of Europeanization? Why not basically carry on with the well-worn but attempted and tested thought of European integration?
Olsen (2002) makes a conclusion that the EU was a political mission (in the framework of unification) and it is in this approach that Europeanization and European integration can be viewed as one and alike thing. To evaluate the connection between European integration and Europeanization, on hand grand theory requires to be examined. Indeed, it is in the course of this examination that shortages with Europeanization and European integration premise may be conquered. In the course of a re-assessment of a most important grand premise from a non-positivist point of view we may better understand the similarities and differences between Europeanization and European integration and how both may make bigger our understanding of the European incorporation.
Haas (1958) presented a clarification of the procedure and development of European integration in the course of his examination of sub-national interests, supranationality, and spillover. He makes an argument that sub-national actors “… in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (p 16). This argument was the same as that of Lindberg (1963) who well thought-out that European integration was “(a) The process whereby nations forego the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision making process to new central organs; and (b) the process whereby political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities to a new centre” (p 6). In these theorists, a shift towards a supranational institution or a new political centre and the swing of allegiances by sub-national players towards this institution. Essentially, sub-national welfare change their commitment to a supranational organization and in so doing further build up supranational organizations and make available a motivation for spillover.
Spillover can be cut down into three types: functional spillover, which is pointed out when integration in one sector/industry comes up with its own momentum and calls for additional integration equally in the alike, and in other sectors or industries. The second one is the cultivated spillover, which makes an assumption that the European Commission will be down to business in the administration of European integration. The third one is political/institutional spillover which “ … describes the accretion of new powers and tasks to a central institutional structure, based on changing demands and the expectation on the part of such political actors as interest groups, political parties and bureaucracies” (Haas, cited in Kirchner, 1976; p 3). Effectively, there is an interaction between supranationality and spillover and in this the “ … establishment of supranational institutions designed to deal with functionally specific tasks will set in motion economic, social and political processes which generate pressures towards further integration” (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991; p 4). This has various implications on the coming up of supranational institutions.
Haas (1958) tagged purposeful spillover the “… expansive logic of sector integration” (p 243). However, the level to which varying incentives formed by spillover permitted an elucidation for task spreading out has been a point of disagreement for neo-functionalists. Nye (1971) stated that the purposeful connection of responsibilities has been a less authoritative mechanism than was at first believed to be the case, while, Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) denies that spillover resulted to the Common Market. Essentially, one could argue that the tribulations with European integration theory and spillover in general happened as the illuminating power of neo-functionalism was condemned.
The main “weakness of neo-functionalism was not empirical but theoretical,once the simple teleology toward integration was abandoned neo-functionalism and other grand theories lacked the resources to construct a positive response. Neo-functionalists made a conclusion that an explanation of integration must be embedded in a multi-causal framework including narrower theories” (Moravcsik, 1998; p 14). However, as it was indicated by George (1976) the “… important question is why?” He makes a suggestion that the rationale had less to do with what was taking place in the EU and further to do with a change in interpretations and values of theory and reality in the USA and “… that the doubts expressed about neo-functionalism were a reflection of the doubts expressed about the techno-managerial society” (p 33) and complicatedness concerning positivist prediction. Without a doubt, at the same moment as neo-functionalism was under analysis unified premises in the USA were also experiencing critical assessment where premises such as structural functionalism were apparent as too nonrepresentational to “… permit concrete theory testing” (Moravcsik, 1998; p 33).
Determining how the public policy will be is a complicated and many-sided process that involves the interaction of numerous individuals and interest groups collaborationg and competing to sway policymakers to act in a certain way. Variety of tactics and tolls are used by these indiviiduals towards advancement of their aims, including support of their positions publicly, attempting to inform supporters and opponents, and mobilizing followers on a particular issue. In this perspective, advocacy can be defined as an attenpt to make an influence within the public by a way of lobbying, education, or political pressure. Advocacy groups “often attempt to educate the general public as well as public policy makers about the nature of problems, what legislation is needed to address problems, and the funding required to provide services or conduct research. Although advocacy is viewed as unseemly by some in the professional and research community, it is clear that public policy priorities are influenced by advocacy. Sound research data can be used to educate the public as well as policy makers, thereby improving the public policy process” (Moravcsik, 1998; p 33).
The following past of this essay will help us, in this perspective of public policy, determine the context in which the UK public policy is currently made.Polls put forward that the UK public remain obstinately skeptical of most the dimensions of the integration development. With this the direction of the European policy in future remains uncertain. It must be acknowledged that one thing that the going up of the Liberal Democrats does not replicate is any good judgment of euro-enthusiasm. In this sagacity, from a pro-European point of view, the recent upward movement of the Liberal Democrats may be well thought-out entirely accidental. The third party is performed strongly because of the sense of wide-ranging malaise, estrangement with the two main parties and the absolute debating skills of their leader. Its rise has taken place not for the reason that of but in spite of its pro-European stance.
Now that the electoral mathematics disentangled in a way that gave the party a control over government satisfactory to embed a pro-European politics, it is clear that this will indeed be the case. The approach of politics possibly will become more ‘continental’ but the essence will be much more doubtful as it becomes subject matter to inter-party discussions. The coming to power of David Cameron threw open the very ground rules of European policy, making it subject matter to some fascinating back-room maneuverings. It may be that on such kind of issues the Liberal Democrats’ increase, pushes the UK nearer to standard ‘European’ advances on such issues (in so far as they exist). But whether this gets to actually help render the EU’s unsuccessful geostrategic guidelines any more flourishing is doubtful.
It is also improbable that the UK’s multifaceted home politicking will have any considerable bearing on the coordination of European towards the economic crisis. Despite the Liberal Democrats’ long-term aspiration to take Britain into the euro, the UK is to be expected to remain relatively detached from any developing EU ‘economic governance’. And the UK is expected to remain insignificant in the efforts to determine the crisis in Greek. Moreover, the Liberal Democrats inclination to conduct a referendum on the UK’s attachment to the EU is a high-risk approach. If voters gets a feeling that were being bended into voting a blanket ‘yes’ to the EU, unable to register concerns over the aspects of European integration that bring about unadulterated concern, a ‘no’ vote may not be as ridiculous as is assumed.
As to Whether Europeanization is an abiding process that will ultimately lead to a complete European government or whether centralization will not be accomplished to overcome persevering national individualities and/or mounting interest in localism is a subject of some discussion.
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